Politics 80X: Politics of the Internet

Excerpts from US and British Planning
on Information Warfare

Information Warfare

The sources for these quotes are:

[1] Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1998. This is commonly referred to as the 1998 Annual Defense Report (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1998). ISBN 0-16-049428-1. Citations here are to the on-line version: [http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr.98/]. Cited hereafter as 1998 Annual Defense Report.

[2] Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review [1997] was released to the public on 19 May 1997. Text at [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/].

[3]Joint Vision 2010 was issued by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalakashvili in 1997: text at [http://usachcs-www.army.mil/DIV&INST/Jv2010.pdf].

[4] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defense. Strategic Defense Review.[http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm] Published as White Paper: Modern Forces for the Modern World (London: The Stationery Office, Ltd., 1998) [ISBN 0-10-139992-8]. More detail is provided in Supporting Essays three and five: Supporting Essays. [ISBN 0-11-772925-8].

Quadrennial Defense Review [1997]

QDR [1997] The five principal components of our evolving C4ISR architecture for 2010 and beyond are:

[i] A robust multi-sensor information grid providing dominant awareness of the battlespace to our commanders and forces;

[ii] Advanced battle-management capabilities that allow employment of our globally deployed forces faster and more flexibly than those of potential adversaries;

[iii] An information operations capability able to penetrate, manipulate, or deny an adversary's battlespace awareness or unimpeded use of his own forces;

[iv] A joint communications grid with adequate capacity, resilience, and network-management capabilities to support the above capabilities as well as the range of communications requirements among commanders and forces;

[v] An information defense system to protect our globally distributed communications and processing network from interference or exploitation by an adversary.

1998 Annual Defense Review

ADR 1998

DoD is moving into the information age and toward a totally integrated battlespace, where communications and intelligence space systems are no longer viewed as solely supporting capabilities to the warfighter, but as instruments of combat.

Joint Vision 2010

JV 2010

[The United States] must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary╣s ability to do the same.

Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or exploit an adversary╣s collection or use of information. It will include both traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary╣s command and control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers.

There should be no misunderstanding that our effort to achieve and maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful enemy attacks on our information systems. Defensive information warfare to protect our ability to conduct information operations will be one of our biggest challenges in the period ahead. Traditional defensive IW operations include physical security measures and encryption. Nontraditional actions will range from antivirus protection to innovative methods of secure data transmission. In addition, increased strategic level programs will be required in this critical area.

Strategic Defence Review

SDR 1998

30. But Britain has only a very limited capability at present to verify the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. A programme is therefore being set in hand to develop expertise in this area, drawing in particular on the skills of specialists at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. A small team will be established to consider technologies, skills and techniques, and to identify what is already available to us in the United Kingdom. The Government will consider how to take this programme forward in the light of the team's interim conclusions. The aim is to ensure that, when the time comes for the inclusion of British nuclear weapons in multilateral negotiations, we will have a significant national capability to contribute to the verification process.