Saturday, March 29, 2003

QUOTES TO REMEMBER

In Tokyo, I’m reacquainting myself with the International Herald Tribune, which The New York Times recently won from it’s erstwhile partner, a Washington paper, in a stereotype maneuver of the Old West.

We’re beginning to gather quotes which future historians can plunder:

David Obey: Speaking to Donald Rumsfeld at a House Appropriations Committee hearing, Representative David Obey (D-Wisconsin) said, with respect to Rumsfeld’s request for ‘flexibility’ in use of appropriated money: “Flexibility is one thing, but being able to turn the Constitution into a pretzel is another thing.” [Source: AP, on The New York Times nytimes.com, 28 March 2003.]

The Non Sequitur cartoon of 29 March 2003 shows two prisoners in a shared cell, and one explains “ . . . so, long story short, it turns out that for the rest of us, the legal term for pre-emptive strike is ‘felonious assault’ . . .” [Source: IHT, 29-30 March 2003.]

Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander of US Army units in the Iraq War: “The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against . . . ” [Source: The New York Times, in IHT, above.] In full, the quote is: “The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of the paramilitary forces. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight.” In fairness, however, failure of the gamers to anticipate cannot be attributed to the paramilitaries, who probably did not take part in designing, conducting, or interpreting the war-games. However, they do seem to work in QA.

Vladimir Putin: The war is “in danger of rocking global stability and the foundations of international law. . . . The only correct solution to the Iraqi problem is the immediate end to military activity in Iraq and resumption of a political settlement in the UN Security Council.“ [Source: AP, in the International Herald Tribune, 29-30 March 2003.]

Bruce 12:49 AM

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WHOSE BLOG?

If you’re curious whose blog this is, check out the three URLs shown in the panel to your left.

And why, despite the war news, is there so little posted this week? I’ve moved my workplace to Tokyo where I’ll be, for the most part, until 1 August. So I’ve been preoccupied with packing, flying, jet lag, and setting up.

Bruce 12:46 AM

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Sunday, March 23, 2003

THE DOG THAT DID NOT BARK IN THE NIGHT

We now are told [Source: Judith Miller, The New York Times, 19 March 2003] that the Pentagon intends to “locate and survey at least 130 and as many as 1,400 possible weapons sites,” that is sites associated with ‘weapons of mass destruction’.

Were UNMOVIC and the IAEA told of these sites? All of these sites? The US was pressed to give some guidance to UNMOVIC, back up its claims about the existence of WMD in Iraq. Some information was passed on. But an earlier New York Times account quoted an unnamed inspector as saying that the US leads were “garbage.”

But there was a dog, and it did not bark. As best we know, at no time did the United States assert that it had given information to UNMOVIC or IAEA which those agencies failed to follow up, or followed inadequately. Given the White House’s readiness to dismiss the inspectors as ineffective, it’s unlikely they would have spared the criticism of “failure to follow up” if that had been the case. So absent contradictory evidence, we come to this provisional but reasonable conclusion: the United States held back information about Iraqi WMD sites, or its claims were not confirmed when inspections took place. [Miller also reports that the Pentagon decided in January to prepare the capability to conduct inspections by itself.]

Bruce 6:11 PM

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Thursday, March 20, 2003

ROBIN COOK’S RESIGNATION SPEECH. HOUSE OF COMMONS.

The text of Robin Cook’s resignation speech (17 March 2003) as leader of the House of Commons, setting out his views on the forthcoming Iraq war, is in Hansard, 17 March 2003, Column 726.

Bruce 10:03 PM

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WITH US OR AGAINST US?

On 19 March 2003 President GW Bush announced the beginning of the war. He said, in part:

I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict.

[Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html ]

Bruce 2:36 PM

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LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD?

CHOOSE ONE

[My Version]

Vice President Dick Cheney being briefed by CIA Director George Tenet on the status of military action in Iraq Thursday morning, March 20, 2003, in the Oval Office. Looking on are President George W. Bush and Chief of Staff Andy Card.

[White House Version]

President George W. Bush receives an update on the status of military action in Iraq Thursday morning, March 20, 2003, in the Oval Office. Present are Vice President Dick Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet and Chief of Staff Andy Card.

Bruce 11:03 AM

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Wednesday, March 19, 2003

REPSONSE TO REQUEST FOR “BALANCED NON-EMOTIONAL” ANALYSIS OF BUSH POLICY

Since May 2001 I’ve tried, in a series of papers, to identify troubling elements of Bush foreign policy. The subjects discussed reflect my conviction that nuclear weapons remain the greatest danger. I’ve stuck to facts and texts as I know them. My judgment remains calm, but I’m appalled by what I see. So these may not, probably do not, meet your criteria of “balanced non-emotional” analysis. To put it bluntly: I see more than 50 years of post-WWII efforts to construct a global system based on restraint and mutual respect, on law and agreement, being swept away by wreckers.

My views about war as choice are set out in the book War Stories (New York & Zurich: Peter Lang, 2001).

The successive papers are

❶   22 May 2001. “Contrary Maxims: Can We Live With Anarcho-Unilateralism?”.

http://www.learnworld.org/TP.2001.05.22.ContraryMax.pdf
http://www.learnworld.org/TP.2001.05.22.ContraryMax.html

Describes Bush aims in [a] national missile defense and [b] ‘space control’, and asserts twelve maxims by which to judge Bush policy.

❷   18 October 2001. “Why This is Not a War and Why It Is Important to Understand That This Is Not a War.”

http://www.learnworld.com/DRAFTS/DRAFT.2001.10.17.NotAWar.html

A highly critical treatment of Bush’s response to 9.11, which [regrettably] prefigures subsequent Bush policies regarding war, public debate, and civil liberties.

❸   20 December 2001. “Treaty Abrogation and GW Bush's Designs on the ABM Treaty.”

http://www.learnworld.org/TX.013=2001.12.20.Abrogati.html

One of the Bush Administration’s first unilateral moves was to announce intention to leave the ABM Treaty. This paper takes up the constitutional and political issues of treaty abrogation by the United States.

❹   1 February 2002. “The US 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications for Nuclear Abolition.”

http://www.learnworld.org/TX.020=2002.02.01.NPR.html
http://www.learnworld.org/TX.020=2002.02.01.NPR.pdf

❺   18 October 2002. “Action Despite GW Bush: Pursuing Nuclear Disarmament in the Face of Sovereign Unilateralism.”

http://www.learnworld.com/DRAFTS/DRAFTS.DD.073=2002.10.18.pdf

Reviews evidence of unilateralism in Bush foreign policy and canvasses measures which states may take to pursue policies in the global interest.

❻   8 December 2002. “Iraq: Go to War? and The Nuclear Question.” [ Version 3]]

http://www.gcdd.net/TX.024=2002.12.08.Iraq.pdf

Obviously most relevant to the Iraq war question, this paper identifies what I consider to be the key points in public US and UK documents as of mid-October 2002 concerning “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq. I isolate the US and UK characterizations of the Iraqi nuclear program and consider ‘coercive inspection’ proposals. In a section titled “WMD Aside, What is the Bush Group After?” I put the greatest weight on calculations of electoral success in November 2002 and November 2004. My views are summarised in this paragraph:

What’s at test in late 2002 is the capacity of the P5 to practice politics, both among themselves and on a broader, more widely representative, stage. What’s at risk, as French leaders have pointed out, is the developed notion of collective security. If the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld exercises are anti-political, their abandonment of collective security on any terms other than their own must not inhibit the collaborative practice of collective security by those governments which champion it.

And in February I added a vehicle for briefer comments:

❼   February 2003 - .. . A serious blog

a href="http://www.learnworld.com/blog/blog.html

to which I'm adding bits and pieces (of which I see this note to you will be one) when I get a chance.

Finally, preventive war. Jay Bookman’s piece in the 29 September 2002 Atlanta Journal-Constitution, which you circulated on IP, suggests the role of policy contributions back to the 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance. A second source is the commitment--under Clinton but even moreso under Bush--to 'space control'. A third is the passionate desire not to be confined by others: something which historians may associate with long-standing hostility to the United Nations so strong in US political life. A fourth is the chimera of perfect defense. Then 9.11 injected into these inclinations a powerful concern to prevent terrorist acts, in their own right and as signs of political failure. I don't know when these strands coalesced into a doctrine of preventive war [mistitled 'preemptive war'] but it’s clear the Bush group has grasped that doctrine as its own.

Bruce 12:08 PM

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Tuesday, March 18, 2003

WHY THIS WAR? WHY IRAQ? WHY NOW?

I accept that the circle around GW Bush has chosen war. In one sense, that is the definitive answer to the question ‘why war against Iraq now?’. It cannot be improved upon.

But we can ask ‘what were they trying to do?’. What was their intention? We would find this episode just a little less bizarre if we could draft an account to answer the 'why?' question.

The starting-point, of course, is that the ostensible reasons offered by the Cheney-Rumsfeld group are patently unpersuasive. No evidence of a significant Iraqi embrace of Al Qaeda has been offered. The US public's widely held view that Iraq was implicated in the 9.11 attacks, a fantasy fostered by the Cheney-Rumsfeld group and held by almost half of US adults, appears to be completely false. And there is yet no evidence of Iraqi ‘weapons of mass destruction’; and Washington must be unable or unwilling to point out to the inspectors where they could find the weapons, which Washington insists Iraq must give up, because it has lodged no complaint that the inspectors have failed to follow hot tips from the White House.

Here are the URLs of some texts worth remembering:

❶ Jay Bookman, deputy editorial page editor of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, wrote an article on 29 September 2002 titled “The President’s Real Goal in Iraq.” Bookman writes that

This war, should it come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years or more in the making, carried out by those who belive the United States must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming the ‘American imperialism’ that our enemies always claimed we were.

Bookman cites three other salient texts.

❷ You can read leaked excerpts from the original draft of a 1992 Defense Planning Guidance which, in Bookman’s words, “envisioned the United States as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and economic power.”

❸ The September 2000 report Building America’s Defenses of the Project for the New American Century, a private organization, draws attention to similarities between proposals in that plan and moves adopted by the GW Bush administration.

❹ The 20 September 2002 US National Security Strategy.

Bruce 11:04 PM

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Saturday, March 15, 2003

Remember Barbara Tuchman’s The March of Folly

Two years ago I published a book titled War Stories (New York & Zurich: Peter Lang, 2001). I wrote that wars begin as choices, for which individual men and women are responsible. This week the responsible persons are George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condaleeza Rice, and others. They have failed to make out a case for war, but appear to be willy-nilly bent on war.

War Stories also sees a titanic struggle between the ‘war script’ and the ‘civic script’. What has been unfolding, focused on Iraq, is a textbook example of such a struggle. At stake are more than fifty years of post-WWII construction of reasoned, argued, public politics. In its place Cheney-Rumsfeld would substitute chauvinism, fear, secret decision, and the rule of force.

The title War Stories emphasises the role of accounts of the past in shaping choices for the future. It’s not that historical accounts bring about wars. Instead, leaderships find among stories the grist for answers to the question “what should we do now?” They may draw on unsound stories, and they may draw unsound conclusions from good stories. The Cheney-Rumsfeld group appears mesmerized by fables of empire. More on that another day.

Today’s word to remember is automaticity. France chose that term to expose the White House’s strategem in the Security Council. The White House would cast aside the UN Security Council and a world of reason. The White House wanted, in what became Resolution 1441 (November 2002), an automatic trigger for war, agreement by the Security Council that war would be made whenever Washington chose. Not unreasonably, France insisted that the use of force was a matter for the Security Council to decide. No single state, except in immediate self-defense, could arrogate to itself the choice of war. France and other countries were peopled and led by reasonable men and women who could muster evidence and calculate for a secure future, as well or better than others. And only a broad consensus among states could ensure ongoing stability and decency.

Bruce 10:51 PM

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Thursday, March 13, 2003

War and Iraq: Has the US Congress Abdicated its Responsibilities?

Did the US Congress, in October 2002, give George W. Bush an unqualified blank check to war against Iraq?

Consider the Act "To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq" which became law on 16 October 2002: full text of the Act in html, or as a pdf document. The most relevant sections state:

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) Authorization.--The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--

(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

There are some reporting requirements, which may have been sugar pills for frightened Legislators but do not effectively diminish the abdication of Congressional responsibility:

(b) Presidential Determination.--In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that--

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and

(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Two texts control US choice for war: the Constitution (Article I Section 8) which states "The Congress shall have the power . . . To declare war . . ." and the 1973 War Powers Act (Public Law 93-148, enacted November 7, 1973) which places a 60-day limit on Presidential war "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces . . ." or other stipulated circumstances are met. The 16 October 2002 Authorization Act provides:

(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.-- (1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) Applicability of other requirements.--Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.


The US Constitution does not authorize Congress to delegate power to declare war. Less on legal grounds than political, it is not possible to justify Congress' failure to consider and evaluate issues, being discussed globally, centered on UN Security Council action and the process of UNSC-ordered UNMOVIC inspections in Iraq. The term which best captures the House and Senate, Democrats and Republicans, is abdication.

Bruce 11:04 AM

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Wednesday, March 12, 2003

Joint Statement of France, Russia, and Germany 2003.03.05

This document represents the position of states seeking to sustain UNMOVIC inspections of Iraq and defer, or prevent, a US war against Baghdad.

Text of joint statement by Foreign Ministers Dominique de Villepin [France], Ivan S. Ivanov [Russia], and Joschka Fischer [Germany], as translated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Source: The New York Times, 6 March 2003.]

++++ THE TEXT ++++


Our common objective remains the full and effective disarmament of Iraq, in compliance with Resolution 1441.

We consider that this objective can be achieved by the peaceful means of the inspections.

We moreover observe that these inspections are producing increasingly encouraging results:

¶ The destruction of the Al Samoud missiles has started and is making progress.

¶ Iraqis are providing biological and chemical information.

¶ The interviews with Iraqi scientists are continuing.

Russia, Germany and France resolutely support Messrs. Blix and ElBaradei and consider the meeting of the Council on March 7 to be an important step in the process put in place.

We firmly call for the Iraqi authorities to cooperate more actively with the inspectors to fully disarm their country. These inspections cannot continue indefinitely.

We consequently ask that the inspections now be speeded up, in keeping with the proposals put forward in the memorandum submitted to the Security Council by our three countries. We must:

¶ Specify and prioritize the remaining issues, program by program.

¶ Establish, for each point, detailed time lines.

Using this method, the inspectors have to present without any delay their work program accompanied by regular progress reports to the Security Council. This program could provide for a meeting clause to enable the Council to evaluate the overall results of this process.

In these circumstances, we will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force.

Russia and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point.

We are at a turning point. Since our goal is the peaceful and full disarmament of Iraq, we have today the chance to obtain through peaceful means a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East, starting with a move forward in the peace process, by:

¶ Publishing and implementing the road map;

¶ Putting together a general framework for the Middle East, based on stability and security, renunciation of force, arms control and trust building measures.


++++++++++++++++++

Bruce 5:48 PM

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US-UK-Spain UNSC Draft on Iraq 2003.03.07

The New York Times reported on 8 March that the UK, US and Spain had circulated a new, altered draft resolution on Iraq. What's important about the draft is that it embodies a trick to shift the power of veto from those who wish to prevent military action to those who seek to be unencumbered in undertaking war against Iraq. Please look at the language:

++++ THE TEXT ++++

The Security Council, . . .

ACTING under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. REAFFIRMS the need for full implementation of Resolution 1441;

2. CALLS ON Iraq immediately to take the decisions necessary in the interests of its people and the region;

3. DECIDES that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by Resolution 1441 unless, on or before March 17, 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under Resolution 1441 and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to Unmovic and the I.A.E.A. of all weapons, weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by Resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items.

++++++++++++++++++

The key word is 'concludes'. The UNSC 'concludes' something by resolution: a formal proposition which is subject to a permanent member's withholding consent ["exercising the veto"] and so defeating it, even if alone. Today, France can veto a US call for war. If the proposed text were adopted—it will not be—the United States could veto any measure to maintain inspections.

Who does the Cheney-Rumsfeld group believe they can trick? If not the sophisticated UN delegations of Security Council members, who could it be? Is this maneuver aimed to deceive the US and British publics?

Bruce 11:48 AM

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